

to Moscow as their Mecca ; language, literature and the arts **186**
must follow suit ; the praise of past achievement is ruled out ; **626**
and even an appreciation of the beauties of nature is a sign of
unhealth and decadence. Stalin is quoted as having said '
that the remnants of capitalism in people's consciousness are
far more alive over the question of nationality than in any
other sphere, since they are able to mask themselves in
national costume ; hence the need to be ever vigilant against
the smallest manifestations of nationalist remnants, in whatever
guise they may appear.

The campaign got into full swing with an article in *Pravda*,
published on 26th December 1950, and subsequently echoed,
in season and out, in all the local press of the five republics.
What follows is taken direct from press and platform diatribes
against 'bourgeois-nationalism' and is no exaggeration. Some-
times there is a trace of unintended humour, but in general
the theme is so reiterative that it produces a conscious reaction
of boredom and even, let it be said, a sense of spiritual hunger.

The first move **186**
is a direction to historians to hold correct **814**
views on the history of their republic in relation to its associa- **626**
tion with Great Russia. In considering the formation of the
Uzbek nation, for instance, the favourable influence of this
association, even with Tsarist Russia, must be the main
theme. For union under the Tsars brought feudal Central
Asia into the system of world capitalism and saved it from
the wretched fate of slavery to British imperialism. The
Stalinist view is that this union slowly developed a bourgeois
nation, out of which was born a socialist nation under the
impact of the Communist Party and with the brotherly assist-
ance of the Russian people. But emphasis is needed on the
prime condition that the Uzbek, or other, nation must desire
to associate its national interests with the vital interests of the
USSR as a whole. Above all, it is to be realized that all
progressive thought, social and economic, was formed under
the beneficent influence of Russian culture, and owes nothing
to Western Europe. The only impact of the latter was the

1 [Sec cat. 116, pp 230-33 Bib. II. 2. 14 st]

186 Anglo-American 'intervention' in the 1919-20 period. Even
 ● 814 the American intervention, claiming to be economic, could
 626 not be dissociated from the political plans of the militarists
 and revealed the bestial character of the American imperialists,
 no disinterested benefactors as was Great Russia. Thus
 historians, philosophers, economists and literary scholars, all
 alike, must in their works display the influence of the Great
 Russian people in the formation of social thought in Asia.
 Their works must be permeated with the Bolshevik Party
 spirit and give a Marxist-Leninist interpretation of the past.
 At the base of every thought must be the treatises of Stalin
 on questions such as linguistics. These will give them a
 correct understanding of the historical process.

538 It follows that resistance to the Russian conquest is no
 186 longer to be seen as a splendid, though unsuccessful, enter-
 626 prise. Henceforth poetry or prose works extolling as national
 heroes the men of Turkish stock who had struggled against
 the establishment of the Russian imperium, must no longer
 be included in histories or anthologies, or be quoted with
 approval. Such actions are futile resistance by a lesser breed
 to an inevitable absorption in a larger whole by dialectical
 historical process working through the Russian people; that
 absorption, even if it pre-dated the Revolution, was, as it were,
 the shadow of what was to come. Those who presume to
 praise the 'heroes' of the resistance are guilty of ideological
 distortion, bourgeois nationalism, patriarchal feudal survival-
 ism, and so on.

This condemnation extends to specific works. The
Kublandi-batir, for instance, is no longer a paean of national
 virtue and valour, but low patter, extolling violence and
 brigandage. It is steeped in the poison of hatred for other
 peoples, in reactionary Muslim ideology and ideas of pan-
 Islam. A local savant is taken to task for presuming to assert
 that this poem is in content near to our own times, having as
 its basic idea patriotism and the love of the people. Only a
 bourgeois-nationalist could thus appraise a poem extolling
 cruelty and brigandage. All views of this kind must be

SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA

631 S.U. to threaten Russian predominance and weaken the links between the
563 central power and each of the five Central Asiatic Republics. The
T Soviet central Government has, therefore, strongly opposed all federa-
631 tive tendencies. Organizations which originally dealt with Central
563 Asia as a whole, such as the Central Asiatic Bureau of the All-Union
Communist Party and the Central Asiatic Economic Council were dis-
banded in 1934. The Soviet Government alleged that the liquidation of
these bodies constituted a recognition of the growing maturity of the
various Central Asiatic Soviet Republics. In reality this measure was
dictated by the desire of the Soviet Government to eliminate anything
which might serve as a lever for the formation of a regional alliance of
non-Russians against the centre.*

T. Even now there is but comparatively little contact between the
517 members of the Central Asiatic cultural élite such as writers, folk-
814 lorists and historians, despite the existence of many problems which
177 could be satisfactorily solved by mutual co-operation. In the majority
S.U. of cases, the only kind of co-operation existing between them operates
563 on the all-Union level, i.e. in a wider framework alongside Ukrainians,
658 Russians, Georgians, Armenians, etc. Thus, for instance, no special
conferences of Central Asiatic writers and historians are held, a fact
which was regretfully admitted by the Uzbek writer Aibek at the
Eleventh Plenum of the Soviet Writers' Union.*

The lack of co-operation and co-ordination leads to the isolation of
the literature and culture of the various Central Asiatic peoples of the
U.S.S.R. The artificial process of separating the national histories of
the various Central Asiatic peoples from each other has favoured
narrow-minded local nationalism and a certain anarchy in the field of
history writing. Textbooks produced for Kazakhstan and Kirghizistan
and for Uzbekistan and Tadzhikistan conflict with each other in a
number of cases.

THE RUSSIANS AS 'ELDER BROTHER'

S.U. The idea which the Soviet régime wishes permanently to implant in
563 Central Asia is that the links between each of the non-Russian peoples
T. and the Russians should be closer than those of the non-Russian peoples
177 among themselves. Moscow wants the Uzbeks, the Tadzhiks, Kazakhs,
626 Turkmenians and Kirghiz to realize that one and all of these peoples owe
a great deal of gratitude to the great Russian brother while they owe
hardly anything to each other. Every Soviet official in Central Asia must

T. 665* At the time of the disbandment of the Central Asiatic Bureau the total number of
organized communists in Uzbekistan (including Karakalpakia), Turkmenistan and
Tadzhikistan amounted to 79,150. In Tadzhikistan and Turkmenistan half of the party
membership consisted of Europeans, in Karakalpakia as much as 70 per cent. Only in
Uzbekistan were 'native' communists in the majority.*